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Abstract: 
The purpose of Matthew Fox's (hereafter F.) latest book is to examine Cicero's use of historical 
exempla in his philosophical and rhetorical dialogues. These exempla reveal the depth and 
influence of Cicero's academic skepticism and his belief that Rome did not possess any sort of 
historical or ideological consistency. F. enjoins us to replace the "unseemly" desire (4) to 
discover Cicero's own thoughts in his philosophical works (which Cicero's own comments at 
Nat. Deo. 1.5.10 indicate to be a fruitless exercise) and instead look at them through the very 
lens that Cicero himself used, that of strict Academic skepticism. History is consistently treated 
by Cicero with an open-ended skepticism that denies certainty; we should not seek, nor will we 
find, coherence of thought regarding Rome, her history, or her future. Historical exempla open 
up the possibility of argument rather than closing it down. Cicero made no attempt to create a 
sort of dogmatic world view, for to do so would countermand his adherence to the Academy; 
history provides its own authority, and does not need Cicero's. A book on Cicero's philosophy of 
history would seem to be an impossible one to write because, as F. notes, "there was no such 
thing as 'philosophy of history' in the ancient world, and Cicero did not write it" (1). F. has 
nevertheless succeeded in writing a book which, though it will not satisfy the need to seek the 
"real" Cicero in Cicero's works, will at least give cause for a reexamination of the evidence. 
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The purpose of Matthew Fox's (hereafter F.) latest book is to examine Cicero's use of historical 
exempla in his philosophical and rhetorical dialogues. These exempla reveal the depth and 
influence of Cicero's academic skepticism and his belief that Rome did not possess any sort of 
historical or ideological consistency. F. enjoins us to replace the "unseemly" desire (4) to 
discover Cicero's own thoughts in his philosophical works (which Cicero's own comments at 
Nat. Deo. 1.5.10 indicate to be a fruitless exercise) and instead look at them through the very 
lens that Cicero himself used, that of strict Academic skepticism. History is consistently treated 
by Cicero with an open-ended skepticism that denies certainty; we should not seek, nor will we 
find, coherence of thought regarding Rome, her history, or her future. Historical exempla open 
up the possibility of argument rather than closing it down. Cicero made no attempt to create a 
sort of dogmatic world view, for to do so would countermand his adherence to the Academy; 
history provides its own authority, and does not need Cicero's. A book on Cicero's philosophy of 
history would seem to be an impossible one to write because, as F. notes, "there was no such 
thing as 'philosophy of history' in the ancient world, and Cicero did not write it" (1). F. has 
nevertheless succeeded in writing a book which, though it will not satisfy the need to seek the 
"real" Cicero in Cicero's works, will at least give cause for a reexamination of the evidence. 
This is not a book for the Cicero specialist, but for readers with a concentrated 
concern for literary and ideological questions of the Late Republic; thus F. avoids 
detailed discussions of Quellenforschung, prosopography, and political 
entanglements. The bibliography is up-to-date, which fits with his expressed desire to 
escape outmoded avenues of thought. The works of Krostenko (2001), Fantham 
(2004), and Dugan (2005) are omnipresent, as are the works of Michel on the self-
consciousness present in the dialogues. There are eleven chapters (inclusive of 
introduction and conclusion), with a bibliography, general index, and index locorum. 
F. focuses his discussion on the De re publica, De oratore, De divinatione, and 
the Brutus; the De legibus, De natura deorum, and Academica are given over to brief 
and, in the case of the De legibus, tangential discussion. 
The introduction lays out the origins of the work and the basic methodology. F.'s 
approach is literary "in that it uses close readings to explore the consequences of the 
tensions over history and philosophy that are intrinsic in Cicero's project" (11), and, as 
he will discuss further in Chapter 10, he does not give preference to critical 
interpretations over the words of the texts themselves. Chapter 2 ("Struggle, 
Compensation, and Argument in Cicero's Philosophy") picks up on these themes, and 
explores what Cicero's own words tell us about his philosophical position. Because of 
the influence of the Academy, we should not expect to find in Cicero's philosophy any 
sort of clear delineation of his personal views. Cicero never makes a claim for any sort 
of philosophical authority, and this non-authoritarian position is actually central to the 
reading of the philosophical works, particularly the dialogues. Cicero perceived 
philosophy to be a marginal activity in Rome but was convinced that it had the 
potential to change the way Rome functioned. Through philosophy 
historical exempla become a way of gathering instruction from the past. But 
philosophy is also a compensation for political impotence, though not a form of 
withdrawal from the public world, and Cicero had mixed feelings about the potential 
success of his program. Thus, philosophy has an unstable relationship to politics, and 
this instability will affect Cicero's use of Rome's history in his dialogues. A second 
function of philosophy is as a salve for grief, though F. believes that philosophical 
composition could not have been any source of real comfort for Cicero. All of this 
combines to create a body of historical philosophizing works that complicates the 
identification of the author's own beliefs and erases from Cicero's philosophical 
persona any semblance of doctrinal authority. 
"Reading and Reception" seeks to dispel the notion that literary interpretation and 
philosophical investigation are different things. The historical grounding found in 
Cicero's philosophy serves to provide empirical proof of the philosophical discussions 
at hand. Cicero wrestles with the concept of history as verification of philosophical 
doctrine and philosophy as a form of thinking that moves beyond history, and 
Academic skepticism provides the only method for Cicero to address this struggle. 
Moreover, modern readings of Cicero as a dogmatist, which lead us to look for 
unequivocal statements of the author's own views, are rooted in his position as the 
canonical school-text of medieval and Renaissance Europe. His rhetoric and oratory 
were judged on their usefulness, and this ascribed authority became attached to his 
philosophy as well, though some later philosophers condemned Ciceronian 
philosophy in no uncertain terms as not being "real" philosophy; Kant, for example, 
called it simply a branch of literature. There is, however, no room in F.'s view of 
Cicero for any traditional method of separating literature and philosophy. 
The next chapter, "Literature, History, and Philosophy: The Example of the De re 
publica" is the most compelling of the book. The underlying thread that runs through 
the whole of the philosophica is that philosophy must be suited to a Roman context. In 
the De re publica Cicero is concerned "to provide Rome with a theoretical 
framework" which will provide his contemporaries with "a conceptual map and 
language" with which to verbalize their thoughts about the res publica (81). Unlike 
Plato, Cicero has chosen a real city for his discussion of the ideal constitution. The 
character of Scipio attempts to reconcile history with theory, and through him (though 
F. is adamant that we should not read Scipio simply as Cicero's mouthpiece) Cicero 
succeeds in raising the suspicion that this is not really history but the use of historical 
anecdotes to demonstrate constitutional theory. By not using himself as a character 
Cicero is appealing to the resistance of the Academy to assign dogmatic authority and 
attempting to break from Plato, but at the same time the De re publica cannot be said 
to represent Cicero's vision of the ideal republic any more than Plato's does his. 
Rome's history as found in the De re publica is idealized to be sure, but it is also 
presented as a history that needs to be considered for the excessive idealization that it 
is. The role of historical anecdote in Cicero's philosophy is to produce a philosophical 
discourse that never strays from familiar tropes and themes, and for a Roman audience 
nothing could be more familiar that Rome's own glorious past. 
Chapter 5, "History with Rhetoric, Rhetoric with History: De oratore and De legibus", 
contains, despite the title, a discussion limited almost exclusively to Book 1 of the De 
oratore, since that book is most concerned with the function of rhetoric as a cultural 
and historical phenomenon. Reading with an awareness of Academic principles of 
philosophical discourse reveals the De oratore to be both an introduction to rhetorical 
theory in Latin and also a reflection on the character of Rome itself. The question 
addressed here is to what extent rhetoric is an essential part of Roman political life. 
The problem is difficult to resolve, since rhetoric's popularity has not been matched 
by corresponding success in producing good orators; conversely, political power has 
not corresponded to oratorical excellence in Rome, despite all the conditions that 
promoted it; Cicero argues that "Rome's history is characterized by the wealth of 
its consilia, the absence of verba" (126). 
In the following chapter ("History and Memory") F.'s argues that history 
via exempla is compelling but by no means authoritarian. Cicero's own ambiguous use 
of history provides the best evidence for a tradition of historical writing that includes 
an ironic critique of its own methods, a tradition that culminates in 
Tacitus' Annales 1.1 (151). We should not think that the historical examples require 
consistent interpretations, since the models chosen lend themselves to a number of 
different interpretations; while the function of exemplary history may remain static, 
individual exempla can be molded to a great variety of different needs. For 
historiography to advance beyond the annalistic tradition, it must both 
stimulate memoria and enhance it. For Cicero, memoria is concerned with 
representation and effect, and it is a function of the memory of the past to bring a 
positive influence to bear on future generations, as with the Janiculum flag-raising 
episode in the Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo. Memoria then becomes a process aimed 
at producing a particular effect, rather than one determined by the process of actual 
recollection. 
The eponymous work of chapter 7, Brutus, is read by F. as a deliberation on both the 
nature of rhetoric at Rome and the attendant problem of writing history, as well as the 
question of the type of person who should exercise political control. The Brutus also 
continues the theme of the De re publica that history is a repository of practical rather 
than theoretical wisdom, but here, for Cicero, that practical wisdom is manifested in 
rhetorical prowess. Thus we can see this history as an attempt to substantiate the 
question from De oratore 1 addressed in Chapter 5: to what extent can rhetoric be said 
to be important in Roman political culture? The history of rhetoric which Cicero gives 
is part and parcel of his interpretation of his era. Rather than resulting in a respectable 
retirement, Cicero's rhetorical skill has imposed a public withdrawal in which his 
previous service and his considerable learning have no effect and yield no personal 
satisfaction; glory, and by extension memoria is something that only dead men are 
able to enjoy (183). 
In Chapter 8, "Divination, History, and Superstition," De divinatione becomes an 
exploration of Cicero's relationship with the institutions of the Republic and a bleak 
encounter with the impossibility of reconciling philosophical self-awareness with 
traditional ways of conducting public life. F. identifies two main challenges to 
interpreting the De divinatione: reconciling the dialectic between Quintus and Marcus, 
who represent the irrational and the rational views of divination, and recognizing the 
depth of historical representation in this work. History is examined "for its ability both 
to contain and to justify a sense of political world order" (214). The complexities 
of De divinatione can be better understood by keeping in mind Cicero's ambivalence 
about the connection between philosophy and public life (see Chapter 2). On the 
subject of dreams, Cicero's skepticism is brought fully to the front; without imagines, 
a rational universe becomes a possibility. The maintenance of social bonds is purely 
for the sake of tradition, but these bonds do not indicate any sort of universal 
philosophical system. Cicero leaves the reader of the De divinatione with an appeal to 
the Academic position (2.72.150) and the enjoinder that, though we are presented with 
different ways to view divination, social practice, and tradition, we should not feel 
pressured to select one as superior to the others. 
In the ninth chapter on "Ironic History in the Roman Tradition," F. argues that 
Cicero's dealing with Roman history is indeed ironic and that ironic history is also 
evident in the work of Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, though these later authors, especially 
Tacitus, are treated cursorily (F. hopes for more work in this area). The neglect of 
irony in Cicero's philosophy has led to a failure to appreciate the full possibilities of 
Cicero's engagement with historical exempla. Historical knowledge is not part of 
philosophy, but the lack of truly Roman philosophy has made Rome's history a 
significant part of adapting Greek philosophy to a Roman context, and thus history 
becomes quite important for Cicero's philosophizing. Cicero's use of history is always 
ironic: while history can connect Cicero's present to the Republican past, he is always 
aware that it is difficult to make the past confirm the present, and though philosophy 
has perhaps been irrelevant to Roman society up to this point, it can and indeed must 
be relevant in the present. Sallust's writings, particularly the Bellum 
Jugurthinum parallel Cicero's own concerns about working with history, such as the 
relationship between power and virtue, and the ironic potential of using 
historical exempla). Livy, on the other hand, cannot be considered an ironic historian, 
since his history depends fully on the authority of the historian. Both Sallust and Livy, 
however, do not express the same anxiety that Cicero does over the nature of Rome's 
political elite and their ability to influence history. 
The final chapter of the main text (the eleventh chapter is for recapitulation) is 
"Cicero from Enlightenment to Idealism." F. investigates what he calls the "rupture in 
understanding" (274) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This rupture caused 
Cicero to be viewed as a philosophical collector and thus squashed any interest in his 
sophisticated use of irony. John Toland's Cicero Illustratus, an admittedly little-
known monograph which made Cicero the paradigm for the politically-engaged 
philosopher, is the focus of this chapter. F. sees Toland as a microcosm for Cicero's 
reception in the post-Renaissance world. Toland's reading encourages us to think of 
reception as a dynamic process -- it is a work concerned with representing Cicero in a 
manner which makes him easier to read for Toland's contemporaries. Toland's strictly 
literary approach uses Cicero's own works as the primary evidence and does not try to 
see through the rhetoric (as most modern scholarship is inclined to do); Toland refuses 
to concede an advantage to the critics over the content of the texts themselves. In this 
respect, Toland provides a precursor to F.'s own argument that we ought to engage the 
texts without judging them by previous scholarly approaches, though F. stops short of 
recommending Toland as the authoritative source for Ciceronian hermeneutics. 
Only three negative items deserve comment, and they concern content and formatting 
rather than factual or interpretational errors. First, F. is not consistent with translating 
Latin citations; this is most obvious on pgs. 123-124, where all citations on the first 
page are translated, but none on the second. Second, as mentioned above, Chapter 5 is 
devoted almost exclusively to the De oratore, though the chapter title would seem to 
indicate equal discussion of both De oratore and De legibus. The four pages devoted 
to the De legibus seem to be an afterthought and do not add much to the chapter or the 
place of the De legibus in the overall picture of F's argument. It would have been 
better to append this slight digression to the end of Ch. 4, and perhaps expand upon it, 
since F. states that the De legibus was "clearly composed as a supplement to the De re 
publica" (244). As a further point here, the switch from the De re publica to rhetoric's 
place in Rome in Chapters 5-7 and back again to a discussion of the institutions of the 
Republic in Chapter 8 is not jarring per se but does seem a bit disconnected. The 
chapters are a valuable contribution to the overall theme of this book, especially the 
discussion ofmemoria, but it seems as if F. has combined two books, "Cicero's 
Philosophy of History" and "Cicero's Rhetoric of History." I do find F.'s conclusions 
about memoria to be intriguing, and I hope that he will expand his work here to a 
detailed investigation of memoria in the speeches, and how it interacts with the full 
force of Cicero's rhetoric. 
Third, in an effort to "shake up preconceptions about the character of Cicero's 
philosophical project," (24) F. has devoted the first eighty pages of this work to a 
summary of what he will be discussing in the following two hundred and forty-two. 
This seems a bit unnecessary and repetitive at times, and if there is one major 
complaint to make about this book it is that the constant repetition becomes, well, 
repetitive. The chapters begin with a summary of what was discussed in the previous 
chapter, then a brief summary of the main points to be covered and their relation to 
the previous chapters, and then a summary of what was discussed at the end of the 
chapter (except Chapter 9, which ends with a single paragraph relating Tacitus' style 
of historiography with Cicero's). Typographical errors are few; there is the odd 
missing quotation mark, as on pg. 127, and a strange symbol used only once on pg. 
107; more often, what may appear to be misspellings are merely alternatives 
("premiss" for "premise," for example, throughout the book). 
The quibbling just mentioned does not, however, detract from an enjoyable and 
thought-provoking book. F. exposes and eloquently expounds on Cicero's use of 
history as a tool for establishing Greek philosophy at Rome yet simultaneously 
providing a non-dogmatic, self-scrutinizing foundation for Roman political life. By 
revealing the origins of the traditional method of reading the philosophical dialogues 
as constructs of the Enlightenment, Cicero's authority as the canonical schoolhouse 
author, and the anti-Ciceronian bias of the great German scholars and philosophers of 
the 18th and 19th centuries, F. has given us the foundation and justification for a 
reevaluation of previous judgments on these works. Like Cicero, F. promises no 
answers or dogmatic readings for us to follow. He states in the beginning of the work 
that we all make our own Ciceros (1), and this book certainly gives us new impetus 
and new tools with which to remake ours. 
 
 
